Source: Securelist
Author: Elsayed Elrefaei, Mohamed Ghobashy
URL: https://securelist.com/esxi-ransomware/121959/
ONE SENTENCE SUMMARY:
BlackNevas devastated ESXi/vCenter and backups using legitimate interfaces, persistence, Host Profile SSH enablement, credential bridges, and weak logging boundaries.
MAIN POINTS:
- GERT observed a 10-day campaign destroying four ESXi hosts, VMs, vCenter, backups.
- No hypervisor exploits occurred; attackers used legitimate VMware management interfaces throughout.
- Babuk ESXi source leak lowered barriers, enabling many families to build ESXi lockers.
- Unsupported ESXi versions increase exposure, even when ransomware targets newer builds too.
- ESXi visibility is asymmetric: guest EDR can’t attribute hypervisor-side VMDK modifications.
- Common access paths include vCenter vulnerabilities, credential reuse, AD abuse, and backup bridges.
- Attackers persisted on VCSA via MeshAgent and Ligolo-ng systemd service masquerading as VMware.
- Host Profiles were weaponized to enable TSM-SSH, then vCenter-originated SSH reached ESXi.
- ESXi hardening controls worth monitoring: execInstalledOnly, acceptance level, and SSH/Shell state.
- Backup infrastructure was intentionally neutralized first, undermining recovery before ESXi detonation.
TAKEAWAYS:
- Treat vCenter as Tier 0: isolate identities, networks, and monitor privileged change sequences.
- Separate virtualization admin credentials from Windows domain administration to prevent credential pivoting.
- Detect correlated behaviors: Host Profile SSH enablement followed by new vCenter-originated SSH sessions.
- Make logging independent: remote syslog and preserved scratch storage are essential for forensics.
- Engineer recovery as a security boundary with independent access, monitoring, and tested restores.